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[Company Law, Business Law and Capital Markets Law in Europe are 
widely influenced by a multitude of regulations and directives as well as by 
the case-law of the European Court of Justice. There have already been nu-
merous cases in which the ECJ gave fresh impetus to several developments 
which were slowed down before by specific statutory provisions of individual 
Member States. The most recent reason for a special fo us on the up-to-date 
developments are the prevailing dynamics in EU-wide harmonization of law 
in general and in particular the Action Plan on “Modernising Company Law 




The outstanding importance of the European Community Law for the legal system 
of the individual member states of the European Union needs no further accentua-
tion. This is especially true for Company and Busine s Law which provides the 
legal framework for business operations. But several problems remain as far as the 
legal treatment of companies which engage in cross-b rder European business 
transactions is concerned. What are the legal rules applying to their registration; 
permanent establishment; company structure; minimum capital; liability; disclo-
sure; creditor and consumer protection; spin-off or merger? There may be special 
interest in a company’s cross-border business transactions which has to be provided 
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for right from the moment the company is incorporated. This may especially require 
providing separate forms of European companies. Another important factor regard-
ing the incorporation of companies and their cross-border transactions are company 
taxes, which significantly influence the choice of l cation and the company’s in-
vestment activity. The selective choice of a legal system has gained an even greater 
importance concerning issues like incorporation expenditures; minimum capital; tax 
burdens; corporate governance; piercing the corporate veil; and rights of co-
determination since the “incorporation doctrine”1 has become so prominent over 
recent times. Those matters are widely influenced by a multitude of regulations and 
directives as well as by the case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). There 
have already been numerous cases, in recent times e.g. th  Centros, Überseering 
and Inspire Art2 which concerned the cross-border transfer of the company’s seat, in 
which the ECJ gave fresh impetus to several developments which were slowed 
down before by specific statutory provisions of indivi ual Member States. The most 
recent reason for a special focus on the up-to-date ev lopments are the prevailing 
dynamics in EU-wide harmonization of law in general and in particular the Action 
Plan on “Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the 
EU”3 presented by the European Commission. 
 
II OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 
Company Law in general is the law of private special purpose associations.4 Having 
an existence separate, but alongside this are fields of law, which do not directly 
regulate such private associations and therefore cannot be considered to be Com-
pany Law in its original sense. Still those fields of law like Accounting Regulations; 
Corporate Group Law; Antitrust Law; (other) competition laws; and Tax Law are 
typically of great importance to companies. All of those fields of law can be sum-
marized in the term of Enterprise Law.5 If those laws and regulations are based on a 
European framework one can speak of European Enterprise Law.6 The most impor-
tant fundamental basis of law on a European level is the EC (Treaty establishing the 
                                                      
1 Compare Part C. 
2 For “Inspire Art” compare note 86. For case law of the BGH [German Federal Supreme Court of 
Justice] concerning European Company Law compare Hartwig Henze, Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht 
in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtshofs, 56 DER BETRIEB (ZEITSCHRIFT) 2159, 2159 ff. (2003). 
3 Compare Part F. 
4 Compare HERBERT WIEDEMANN, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 3 (1st ed. 1980). 
5 Kurt Ballerstedt, GmbH-Reform, Mitbestimmung, Unternehmensrecht, 135 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS 
GESAMTE HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 478, 484 (1971), tried to define this term in general. It 
has to be agreed with KARSTEN SCHMIDT, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT (4th ed. 2002) § 1 II. 4. b, that the term 
has not yet been clearly defined after all (see also Martina Deckert, Europäisches Unternehmensrecht – 
Stand und Probleme, 7 EUROPÄISCHES WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERRECHT 265 n. 2 (1996)). Compare 
the proposed structure by MARCUS LUTTER, EUROPÄISCHES UNTERNEHMENSRECHT 4 (4th ed. 1996). 
Concerning the distinguishing between capital markets law compare MATHIAS HABERSACK, 
EUROPÄISCHES GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT n. 4 (1999) and SCHMIDT, id. at § 1 II. 3. 
6 Any agreements based on Art. 293 EC can be counted i  as well; compare WOLFGANG KILIAN , 
EUROPÄISCHES WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT n. 477 (1996). 
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European Community) as a part of the primary legislation.7 The EC (Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community) contains the most general regulations about the 
European Community and how it is constituted as well as regulations which can be 
assigned to Company and Enterprise Law. In contrast o law making by Regula-
tions, which is of no major significance in European Company and Enterprise Law,8 
law making by Directives is of great importance (Art. 249 (3) EC).9 
A Freedom of Establishment 
The freedom of establishment is provided for in Art. 43 EC. Due to Art. 48 (1) EC 
it can also be applied to companies, which comply with Art. 48 (2) EC. The general 
principle of the freedom of establishment has been imbedded in the European 
Company and Enterprise Law for a long time, especially in the van Gend & Loos 
cases.10 The principle of freedom of establishment has been used as a yardstick by 
the ECJ in various fields of the European Company and Enterprise Law to decide 
about the applicability of national state laws.11 Once a related case comes up, first 
of all it has to be decided upon whether the scope of protection12 of the freedom of 
establishment is applicable. In doing so it has to be distinguished between the 
factual and the personal scope of protection. Within e factual scope of protection 
it has to be clarified whether the affected activity is indeed an act of free movement 
(Art. 43 (1) (1) EC). Art. 43 (2) and Art. 43 (1) (2) EC therefore try to define the act 
of free movement. Apart from this definition, the ECJ often13 defines the freedom 
of establishment as “the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed 
establishment in another Member State for an indefiit  period”. This is done 
without noticing how this definition should be interpreted in context of the formal 
definition of the freedom of establishment in Art. 43 (2), (1) (2) EC. The ECJ seems 
to assume that the formal definition in Art. 43 (1)2 , (2) EC does not exclusively 
determine a definition of the freedom of establishment but instead provides a basis 
for an interpretation and enhancement of the definition in Art. 43 (1) (1) EC. How-
ever, it remains questionable whether this interpretation could easily be reconciled 
                                                      
7 Regarding the term and the individual parts compare ALBERT BLECKMANN , EUROPARECHT n. 526 (6th 
ed. 1997). 
8 Regulations and Directives are part of the secondary law, compare BLECKMANN , supra note 7, at 
n. 527 ff. 
9 Peter Wiesner provides a good overview about all Directives concerning the European Enterprise Law 
in his series of articles in EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, compare 270 (1992); 
500 (1993); 588 (1994); 821 (1995); 619 (1998) and Peter Wiesner, 56 BETRIEBSBERATER 
(ZEITSCHRIFT), issue 44, addendum 8 (2001). The important cases of the ECJ concerning European 
Company and Enterprise Law are documented and commented within CASEBOOK EUROPÄISCHES 
GESELLSCHAFTS- UND UNTERNEHMENSRECHT (Ingo Saenger et. al ed., 2002).  
10 Compare e.g. Peter Behrens, Das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht nach dem Centros-Urteil des 
EuGH, 19 PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS (ZEITSCHRIFT) 323, n. 10, 
13 (1999). Compare ECJ, Rec. 1974, 631 “Reyners”, in which the ECJ provided for the freedom of 
establishment even against the very wording of the ormer Art. 43 in the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
11 Especially applicable concerning individual national tax regulations, compare Ulrich Klinke, 
Europäisches Unternehmensrecht und EuGH – Die Rechtsprechung in den Jahren 1993-1994, 24
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 373, 391 f. (1995). 
12 This approach is originally taken from the dogmatic of German Basic Rights but can be transferred to 
the fundamental rights. 
13 Compare ECJ, Rec. 1991, I-3905 “Factortame II”, para 20. 
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with the formal definition in Art. 43 (1) (1) EC, namely that the right of establish-
ment shall be interpreted “within the framework of the provisions set out below”. 
As far as the second part of the protection is concerned, namely the personal scope 
of protection, due to Art. 48 (1) EC the freedom of establishment shall be applicable 
to companies, which comply with Art. 48 (2) EC.14 In most of the cases it is quite 
sufficient to state that the affected company corresponds with the requirements of 
Art. 48 (2) EC.  
 
If the scope of protection of the freedom of establishment is applicable, it will be 
determined in a second step whether the given procedure is indeed a restriction as 
referred to in Art. 43 EC. Though, the most recent cases decided by the ECJ can 
only be understood if one is familiar with the development of the cases dealing with 
fundamental freedoms in general. One has to be especially aware of the fact that 
fundamental freedoms have undergone a development from just being a discrimina-
tion ban15 to being a ban on restrictions. If fundamental freedoms are understood as 
being only a discrimination ban, they will not provide for more than the right not to 
be discriminated against by a state on the basis of foreign citizenship. If a citizen of 
a Member State is subject to a regulation of another M mber State, which treats 
him worse than a domestic citizen (e.g. the requirement of a permission to take up 
an activity), he will be able to deny the application of such a regulation based on the 
principles of fundamental freedoms. Discrimination n general requires two compa-
rable16 circumstances to be treated differently. Those different treatments need to be 
based on citizenship. Therefore it is required as abasic principle that the regulation 
uses the citizenship of a person or a company’s seat17 as a link to a different treat-
ment. This is called direct and overt discrimination. But discrimination can also be 
indirect or covert. In such cases the national regulation is not based on citizenship 
but instead links to other criteria which are still typically met by foreigners. There-
fore it can be called a discrimination against foreign rs based on citizenship as well. 
That is called covert discrimination.18 If one takes a close look at a scenario where a 
Member State even treats his very own citizens in an in ppropriate way it becomes 
clear that fundamental freedoms – if understood as just being a discrimination ban – 
will not be of any help to the national citizens at all. They could only demand to be 
treated as equally inappropriate as anyone but could not question the regulation 
itself.  
 
                                                      
14 Regarding those two regulations GÜNTHER CHRISTIAN SCHWARZ, EUROPÄISCHES  
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT n. 147 ff. (2000). 
15 Sometimes also called no discrimination against domestic citizens (compare General Attorney, Rec. 
1999, I-1459 ”La Pergola”, 1468; STEFAN ULRICH PIEPER, ANDRES SCHOLLMEIER &  DIETER 
KRIMPHOVE, EUROPARECHT – DAS CASEBOOK 221 (2nd ed., 2000).  
16 Comparability is especially important in cases concer ing tax law, compare ECJ, Rec. 1999, I-6161 
“St. Gobain” para 45.  
17 The company’s seat is treated just like the citizenship of an actual person (compare Art. 48 (1) EC), 
compare ECJ, Rec. 1986, 273. 
18 Compare again “Factortame II”, supra note 13. 
2005 European Company and Business Law   301     
 
After all, fundamental freedoms attain a much broader scope of protection if they 
are understood as being a ban on restrictions.19 Then they will not only be applica-
ble to regulations discriminating against foreigners but to all kinds of restrictions. 
Fundamental freedoms will provide protection against regulations which do not 
distinguish between foreign and domestic citizens of the Member State as well. 
Therefore they work just like the basic rights of the German Basic Law:20 If there is 
a substantial burden or restriction (encroachment), it will only matter whether the 
restriction passes the proportionality test or can be justified by opposed interests 
(compare the freedom of establishment Art. 46 (1) EC . 
 
The development of the fundamental freedoms as discussed above has been already 
applied by the ECJ in the areas of the freedom of trade and the freedom to provide 
services. The landmark decision Dassonville21 applied Art. 28 (1) EC to “all trading 
rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indi-
rectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade” (so called Dassonville for-
mula) which can be seen as the broadest possible definition of all. Thus, the ECJ 
tried to make two corrections to its adjudication: Certain restrictions were granted 
to be an exemption from the Dassonville formula in the Keck-Case.22 Additionally 
certain justifications were approved concerning notdiscriminating regulations 
applicable in the same way to residents as well as to aliens in Cassis de Dijon.23 
Still, the ECJ extended the scope of protection of the freedom of trade enormously. 
A similar development can be recognized as far as the freedom to provide services 
(Art. 49 ff. EC) is concerned. The important decision  in this field are 
van Binsbergen24 and Säger / Dennemeyer.25 Although the ECJ has not yet finally 
decided upon whether the freedom of establishment has to be interpreted as a ban 
on restrictions, there are cases like Klopp26 who seem to indicate such an interpreta-
tion.27 
 
But the derivation of a ban on restrictions from the fundamental freedoms has to be 
called at least questionable.28 Due to Art. 43 (1) EC the freedom of establishment is 
provided for only “within the framework of the provisions set out below” Art. 43 
EC. This framework contains especially Art. 43 (2) EC which only provides for a 
                                                      
19 Regarding this, HELMUT LECHELER, EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS EUROPARECHT 264 ff. (2000); MANFRED A. 
DAUSES, HANDBUCH DES EU-WIRTSCHAFTSRECHTS E.I. n. 61 ff. (1998); HEINZ STREINZ, 
EUROPARECHT n. 669 ff. (5th ed, 2001)  
20 Correctly pointed out by Dieter Blumenwitz, Rechtsprobleme im Zusammenhang mit der Angleichung 
von Rechtsvorschriften auf dem Gebiet des Niederlassungsrechts der freien Berufe - Eine Darstellung 
anhand einer aktuellen Problematik im Bereich der ärztlichen Heilberufe, 42 NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT 621, 622 (1989). 
21 ECJ, Rec. 1974, 837.  
22 ECJ, Rec. 1993, I-6097.  
23 ECJ, Rec. 1979, 649.  
24 ECJ, Rec. 1979, 1299. 
25 ECJ, Rec. 1991, I-4221. 
26 ECJ, Rec. 1984, 2971. 
27 Blumenwitz, supra note 20, at 623; PIEPER, SCHOLLMEIER &  KRIMPHOVE, supra note 15, at 221; 
SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at n. 137 ff.; Rolf Wägenbaur, Inhalt und Etappen der Niederlassungsfreiheit, 
2 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 427, 431 (1991). 
28 For a well done comprehension of the important arguments see Blumenwitz, supra note 20, at 622 f. 
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right of equality, i.e. the right for a citizen of a foreign Member State not to be 
treated worse than a domestic citizen. This absolutely non-ambiguous wording 
distinguishes the freedom of establishment29 from the freedom of the movement of 
capital which does not contain such a restriction (Art. 56 EC: “all restrictions on the 
movement of capital”).30 A European-wide legal harmonization based on Art. 43 
EC is therefore impossible. This is especially true d  to the fact that Art. 47 (2) EC 
provides a special authority for such harmonizations.31 The ECJ therefore cannot 
ignore the specifications of the EC. But just like n other areas the ECJ has disre-
garded the dogmatics in its adjudication. The ECJ is expected to synchronise its 
adjudication to the individual fundamental freedoms soon and is consequently 
expected to interpret the freedom of establishment as an extensive ban on restric-
tions. 
 
The question remains whether one can refer to the freedom of establishment with 
regard to ones’ own Member State.32 But the answer to this question is quite obvi-
ous when one takes a look at the very wording of Art. 43 (1) (1) EC: It covers only 
“restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the 
territory of another Member State”. But the ECJ allowed some extensions within 
this area as well.33 So if there is a restriction on the freedom of establishment, it will 
be examined – comparable to the German Basic Rights dogmatics – whether there 
is a justification for this restriction.34 Such a justification can first of all arise from 
Art. 46 (1) EC.35 But Art. 46 EC is very narrowly worded and is on the other hand 
also narrowly interpreted by the ECJ. Therefore it leaves no room for the use as a 
justification of a restriction in most of the cases. Besides that, the general possibility 
of a restriction which the ECJ developed within Cassis de Dijon36 – although re-
garding the freedom of trade – is applicable to the fre dom of establishment.37 
According to that adjudication, restrictions on both foreign and domestic citizens 
can be justified by the “general good […] provided that such application is effected 
without discrimination”.38 Additionally, the so-called “abusive exercise” adjudica-
                                                      
29 Compare Art. 3 (2) EC and Art. 50(3) EC. 
30 Streinz, supra note 19, at n. 667. 
31 Blumenwitz, supra note 20, at 622; Wägenbaur, supra note 27, at 430.  
32 This problem has to be distinguished from the problem whether the freedom of establishment includes 
a ban on restrictions (correctly pointed out by PETER BEHRENS, PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- 
UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS 354, 360 (1989)). Nonetheless, those problems are connected with each other 
as Art. 43 EC would not be applicable at all if understood as being just a ban on discriminations. 
33 Compare BEHRENS, supra note 32, at 360; Blumenwitz, supra  note 20, at 624 f.; Ulrich Klinke, 
Europäisches Unternehmensrecht und EuGH, 23 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR UNTERNEHMENS- UND 
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 153, 158 ff. (1994). 
34 Compare the graphic description by General Attorney Tesauro in ECJ, Rec. 1998, I-4698 “ICI” 
para 20. 
35 In detail concerning Art. 46 (2) EC compare Dauses, upra note 19, E. I. at n. 72 ff. 
36 Compare supra note 23. 
37 ECJ, Rec. 1977, 765 “Thieffry” para 18. Concerning that case Lecheler, supra note 19, at 244 ff. and 
268. 
38 ECJ, Rec. 1988, 2085 “Bond van Adverteerders” para 32. 
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tion, which the ECJ applies in a wide variety of cases,39 may serve as a basis for a 
justification.40 
 
B Company Law 
Company Law is the most important sub area of the European Enterprise Law. In 
1985 a new legal form was established that could operate across European borders. 
This was called the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG), regulated within 
the EEIG council regulation.41 Until quite recently the EEIG has been the only 
original European legal form of a company recognised throughout the EU. The 
EEIG was created following the French Groupement d‘Intérèt Economique in order 
to enable small and medium-sized enterprises to participate in the Single European 
Market. But due to its limited applications the EEIG is actually of little practical 
importance.42 It is mainly used for freelance activities as well as for research co-
operations; working-groups; and for distribution and advertising organisations.  
 
Therefore, it is even more significant that recently a Statute for a European Com-
pany (SE) has finally been established after more than 30 years of quarrels about 
matters like the involvement of employees and the inclusion of Company Group 
Law.43 Furthermore, there has been a number of proposals for additional European 
legal forms of companies like the “Amended proposal for a Council Regulation on 
the Statute for a European Association (EA)”;44 the “Amended proposal for a 
Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society (SCE)”;45 
and the “Amended proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European 
                                                      
39 Regarding the European Enterprise Law compare “Centros” (see supra note 10) para 24; ECJ, Rec. 
2000, I-1705; “Diamantis” para 33 – 34 . 
40 But it is no restriction on the general legal execution, like e.g. a ban on improper legal use; regarding 
this compare “Diamantis” (see supra note 39). 
41 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping 
(EEIG) Official Journal L 199, 31/07/1985 p. 1 – 9. 
42 Christoph Graf Von Bernstorff, Das Unternehmensrecht in Europa (Teil I), 9 EUROPÄISCHES 
WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERRECHT (ZEITSCHRIFT) 397, 400 f. (1998). 
43 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October, 2001 on the Statute for a European Company 
(SE), Official Journal L 294, 10/11/2001, 1 ff. and Council Directive 2001/86/EEC of 8 October, 2001 
supplementing the Statute for a European Company with regard to the involvement of employees, 
Official Journal L 294, 10/11/2001, 22 ff. Compare also Peter Hommelhoff, Einige Bemerkungen zur 
Organisationsverfassung der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, 45 DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
(ZEITSCHRIFT) 279, 279 ff. (2001); Andreas Jahn & Ebba Herfs-Röttgen, Die Europäische AG – Societas 
Europaea, 54 DER BETRIEB (ZEITSCHRIFT) 631, 631 ff. (2001); Andreas Kellerhals & Dirk Trüten, 
Neues zur Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, 97 SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 337, 337 ff. 
(2001); Sorika Pluskat, Die neuen Vorschläge für die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft, 12 EUROPÄISCHE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 524, 524 ff. (2001); Peter Wiesner, Der Nizza-Kompromiss zur 
Europa-AG – Triumph oder Fehlschlag, 22 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 397, 397 ff. (2001). 
Compare also SCHWARZ, supra note 14, at n.1085 ff. 
44 Official Journal C 236, 31/08/1993, 1. The European Association shall mainly include charity associa-
tions and charity foundations. 
45 Official Journal C 236, 1993, 17. The European Cooperative Society shall of course mainly include 
co-operatives. See also the Directive 2003/72/EEC of 22 July, 2003, Official Journal L 207, 2003, 25 and 
the Regulation (EC) No. 1435/2003 of 22 July, 2003, Official Journal L 207, 2003, 1. 
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Mutual society (ME)”.46 The Statute for a European Cooperative Society has al-
ready been converted into a Council Regulation in July 2003 and shall be applied 
from August 2006 onwards. Thus, it will be apparent that there were several at-
tempts in the EU to establish legal forms that can co duct business across European 
borders and without the necessity to adhere to the company law regulations of a 
particular EU State. 
 
So far the original European legal forms of companies have only been of secondary 
importance which eventually results in a questionable significance of the Direc-
tives. Moreover, there are obvious differences betwe n Directives which are already 
in force and on the other hand mere proposals for Council Regulations. A key 
directive within Company Law is the “share capital” Directive,47 which includes 
regulations about the capital maintenance and alteration of public limited compa-
nies. There are a number of other important Directiv s within the area of Company 
Law. On the one hand the “disclosure” Directive48 imposes significant regulations 
regarding compulsory disclosure requirements for specific forms of companies like 
the German Aktiengesellschaft (stock option corporation or German public limited 
corporation), Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien (commercial partnership limited by 
shares) and Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (limited liability company). On 
the other hand there is the so-called “structure” Directive which includes detailed 
regulations concerning the structure of public limited companies.49 However, this 
Directive is not in force yet but remains in the legislative process as a proposal for a 
Council Directive. Worth mentioning for having a bearing on Company Law are 
also the Articles 1 – 2, 4 et seqq. of the Twelfth Council Company Law Directive 
on single-member private limited-liability companies50 and the planned proposal for 
                                                      
46 Official Journal C 236, 1993, 40. The European Provident Mutual Society is especially designed for 
cross-border mutual activities concerning precautions and insurances. 
47 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December, 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for 
the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies 
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of 
public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to 
making such safeguards equivalent, Official Journal L 026, 31/01/1977, 1 - 13; amended by the Council 
Directive 92/101/EEC of 23 November, 1992 amending Directive 77/91/EEC on the formation of public 
limited-liability companies and the maintenance and lteration of their capital, Official Journal L 347, 
28/11/1992, 64 - 66. 
48 First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March, 1968 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the 
protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within 
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards 
equivalent throughout the Community, Official Journal L 65, 14/03/1968, 8 - 12. 
49 Third Amendment to the proposal for a Fifth Council Directive based on Article 54 of the Treaty 
concerning the structure of public limited companies and the power and obligations of their organs, 
Official Journal, C 321, 20/11/1991, 9 ff. In detail concerning the “structure” Directive compare 
Schwarz, supra note 14, at n. 705 ff. with additional references just ahead of n. 705. 
50 Twelfth Council Company Law Directive 89/667/EEC of 21 December, 1989 on single-member 
private limited liability companies, Official Journal L 395, 30/12/1989, 40 ff. Compare also Hans-
Werner Eckert, Die Harmonisierung des Rechts der Einpersonen-GmbH, 1 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 54, 54 ff. (1990); Marcus Lutter, Mißglückte Rechtsangleichung: das Chaos 
der Ein-Personen-Gesellschaft in Europa, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-ERICH BRANDNER 81, 81 ff. 
(1996); Hans-Christoph Schimmelpfennig & Christoph E. Hauschka, Die Zulassung der Ein-Personen-
GmbH in Europa und die Änderungen des deutschen GmbH-Rechts, 45 NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT 942, 942 ff. (1992). 
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a 14th Company Law Directive on the cross-border transfer o  the registered office 
of limited companies. 
 
C Corporate Transformation Law, Takeover Law and    
Company Group Law.  
The Corporate Transformation Law, Takeover Law and Company Group Law are 
naturally closely related to Company Law in general. At the European level rules on 
corporate transformations can be found in the “mergers” Directive51 and in the 
“divisions” Directive.52 Worth mentioning as well is the proposal for a “cross-
border mergers” Directive53 which remains in the legislative process though.  
 
But this whole field of law generally remains subject to fierce discussions. A good 
example of that may be the “takeover” Directive. It has been vehemently discussed 
within past decades54 and its amended proposal for a Company Law Directiv 55 has 
been turned down by the European Parliament in its th rd and crucial reading on 
July 4th, 2001. Surprisingly, a breakthrough has been reached more than two years 
afterwards in late 2003.56 In contrast, the Ninth Company Group Law Directive 
might not have the slightest prospects of being approved and is even considered to 
be “dead” by some legal writers.57 Moreover, German legal writers are also very 
sceptical whether the Directive on single-member private limited-liability compa-
nies58 includes any aspects of Company Group Law at all.59 It is quite significant 
                                                      
51 Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC of 9 October, 1978 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty 
concerning mergers of public limited liability companies, Official Journal L 295, 20/10/1978, 36 ff. 
(Third Council Company Law Directive, so-called “merg rs” Directive). 
52 Sixth Council Directive 82/891/EEC of 17 December, 1982 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty, 
concerning the division of public limited liability companies, Official Journal L 378, 31/12/1982, 47 ff. 
(Sixth Council Company Law Directive, so-called “divisions” Directive). 
53 Proposal for a Tenth Directive of the Council based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty concerning 
cross-border mergers of public limited companies, Official Journal C 23, 25/01/1985, 11. 
54 Compare for instance Karsten Munscheck, Der Vorschlag zur EG-Übernahmerichtlinie, 41 RECHT 
DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 388, 388 ff. (1995); Gunnar Schuster, Der neue Vorschlag für eine 
EG-Takeover-Richtlinie und seine Auswirkungen auf den Übernahmekodex, 8 EUROPÄISCHE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 237, 237 ff. (1997); Martin Weber, Der geänderte Vorschlag der 
Kommission für eine Takeover-Richtlinie vom 10. 11. 1997, 9 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 464, 464 ff. (1998); Carl-Heinz Witt, Der neue Vorschlag für eine EG-Richtlinie 
über Übernahmeangebote, 9 EUROPÄISCHES WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERRECHT (ZEITSCHRIFT) 318, 318 
ff. (1998). 
55 Amended proposal for a thirteenth European Parliament and Council Directive on company law 
concerning takeover bids, Official Journal C 378, 13/12/1997, 10. 
56 Compare Part E. 
57 Klaus J. Hopt, Europäisches Konzernrecht?, 10 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 
577, 577 ff. (1999). 
58 See supra note 50. 
59 Compare Tim Drygala, Konzernhaftung und Einmann-Richtlinie, 13 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 1528, 1528 ff. (1992); Heribert Hirte, Die Zwölfte EG-Richtlinie als Baustein eines 
Europäischen Konzernrechts?, 13 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 1122, 1122 ff. (1992); Peter 
Kindler, Gemeinschaftsrechtliche Grenzen der Konzernhaftung i  der Einmann-GmbH, 157 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS GESAMTE HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 1, 1 ff. (1993); Wienand Meilicke, 
Unvereinbarkeit der Video-Rechtsprechung mit EG-Recht, 45 DER BETRIEB (ZEITSCHRIFT) 1867, 
1867 ff. (1992); Hans-Werner Neye, Die Video-Rechtsprechung und das EG-Recht, DEUTSCHE 
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though that the new Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertak-
ings (“EC Merger Regulation”) has finally been implemented in April 2004 and 
brought along some important changes. As regards the basic criterion for analysing 
mergers, the Regulation determines the “substantial lessening of competition” 
criterion used in other jurisdictions – e.g. in theUnited States and Australia – as the 
new basic criterion replacing the former “dominant position” criterion that had been 
used up to that point. 
 
D Accounting Regulations 
The European Accounting Directives include very detail d rules for the national 
jurisdictions of the Member States. On the one hand it consists of the Fourth Coun-
cil Directive on the annual accounts60 which is also called the “accounts” Directive 
and which was amended particularly by the “SME” Directive61 and another Council 
Directive on consolidated accounts regarding the scope of the former Directives.62 
On the other hand the European Accounting Directives nclude the Seventh Council 
Company Law Directive on consolidated accounts63 and the Eighth Council Com-
pany Law Directive on auditors.64 For each financial year starting on or after Janu-
ary 1st, 2005, Member States may permit or require companies governed by their 
law according to Art. 5 of the IAS regulation65 to prepare their consolidated ac-
counts in conformity with the international accounting standards as defined in Art. 
2 of the IAS regulation. An easing of rules for small and medium-sized companies 
is included in the “SME” Directive66 and another Council Directive67 includes the 
                                                                                                                               
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 452, 452 ff. (1992); Wulf-Henning Roth, „Video“-Nachlese und 
das (immer noch) vergessene Gemeinschaftsrecht, 13 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 1054, 
1054 ff. (1992); Matthias Schüppen, Haftung im qualifiziert faktischen GmbH-Konzern und 12. EG-
Richtlinie, DER BETRIEB (ZEITSCHRIFT) 969, 969 ff. (1993); Hans-Detlef Schwarz, GmbH-Konzernrecht 
und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, INTERNATIONALES STEUERRECHT 23, 23 ff. (1993); Ulrich B. 
Wilhelm, Haftung im qualifiziert-faktischen Konzern und Europarecht 4 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 729, 729 ff. (1993). 
60 Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July, 1978 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the 
annual accounts of certain types of companies, Official Journal L 222, 14/08/1978, 11 ff. (Fourth 
Council Company Law Directive). 
61 Council Directive 90/604/EEC of 8 November, 1990 amending Directive 78/660/EEC on annual 
accounts and Directive 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts as concerns the exemptions for small and 
medium-sized companies and the publication of accounts in ecus, Official Journal L 317, 16/11/1990, 57 
ff. 
62 Council Directive 90/605/EEC of 8 November, 1990 amending Directive 78/660/EEC of annual 
accounts and Directive 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts as regards the scope of those Directives, 
Official Journal L 317, 16/11/1990, 60 ff. 
63 Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June, 1983 based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty 
on consolidated accounts, Official Journal L 193, 18/07/1983, 1 ff. (Seventh Council Company Law 
Directive). 
64 Eighth Council Directive 84/253/EEC of 10 April 1984 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the 
approval of persons responsible for carrying out the statutory audits of accounting documents, Official 
Journal L 126, 12/05/1984, 20 ff. (Eighth Council Company Law Directive). 
65 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July, 2002 on the 
application of international accounting standards, Official Journal L 243, 11/09/2002, 1 ff. 
66 Council Directive 90/604/EEC of 8 November, 1990 amending Directive 78/660/EEC on annual 
accounts and Directive 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts as concerns the exemptions for small and 
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German legal form of a GmbH & Co. KG into the scope of the “accounts” Direc-
tive. There are also some Commission Recommendations w rth mentioning. They 
are the Commission Recommendation of November 15th, 2000 on the quality assur-
ance for the statutory audit;68 the Commission Recommendation of May 30th, 2001 
on environmental issues in the annual accounts;69 and the Commission Recommen-
dation of May 16th, 2002 on the statutory auditors’ independence in the EU.70 
 
E  Disclosure 
The disclosure requirements are closely related to accounting regulations and can 
therefore be regarded as being a legal sub-area of Eur pean Enterprise Law. The 
requirements are contained within the first section of the “disclosure” Directive,71 
within the Council Directive on disclosure requirements in respect of company 
branches72 and also within the tenth section of the “accounts” Directive.73 Finally an 
amendment to the Directive 68/151/EEC was proposed with regards to disclosure 
requirements in respect of certain types of companies.74 
 
F Antitrust Law 
The European Antitrust Law established itself as a separate and widely recognized 
branch of law within the general European Enterprise Law. Statutory basis for 
Antitrust Laws are included both within the Art. 81et seqq. EC and within various 
Regulations like the Merger Regulation and the Block Exemption Regulations.  
 
G  Tax Law  
The European Tax Law has long since concentrated on indirect taxation. This was 
caused by Art. 93 EC, which only provides a specific legal foundation for indirect 
taxation. Several Directives concerning indirect taxa ion had already been issued at 
a very early stage of the EU. In the meantime several Directives have been issued 
                                                                                                                               
medium-sized companies and the publication of accounts in ecus, Official Journal L 317, 16/11/1990, 57 
ff. 
67 Council Directive 90/605/EEC of 8 November, 1990 amending Directive 78/660/EEC of annual 
accounts and Directive 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts as regards the scope of those Directives, 
Official Journal L 317, 16/11/1990 60 ff. 
68 Commission Recommendation of 15 November, 2000 on quality assurance for the statutory audit in 
the European Union: minimum requirements, Official Journal L 91, 31/03/2001, 91 ff. 
69 Commission Recommendation of 30 May, 2001 on the recognition, measurement and disclosure of 
environmental issues in the annual accounts and annual reports of companies, Official Journal L 156, 
13/06/2001, 33 ff. 
70 Commission Recommendation of 16 May, 2002 – Statutory Auditors’ Independence in the EU: A Set 
of Fundamental Principles, Official Journal L 191, 19/07/2002, 22 ff. 
71 Compare supra note 48. 
72 Eleventh Council Directive 89/666/EEC of 21 Decembr, 1989 concerning disclosure requirements in 
respect of branches opened in a Member State by certain types of company governed by the law of 
another State, Official Journal L 395, 30/12/1989, 36 ff. (Eleventh Council Company Law Directive). 
73 Compare supra note 60. 
74 KOM (2002) 279 endg., Official Journal C 227, 24/09/2002, 377 ff. 
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amongst all Member States aimed at a legal harmonization of indirect taxation 
especially with regards to turnover tax and excise duties.75 In contrast, the only 
legal foundation for a legal harmonization of direct taxation among the Member 
States is the most general legal foundation of Art. 94 EC, which concerns all kinds 
of legal harmonizations. Therefore, legal harmonization of direct taxation based on 
this particular legal foundation is an especially difficult issue and has not pro-
gressed well so far due to Art. 94 EC requiring unanimity. Those difficulties led to 
the delay of some directives like the “taxation of mergers” Directive76 and the 
“parent and subsidiary” Directive77 which did not go into force until 1990. 
 
H Capital Markets Law  
The Capital Markets Law may be considered to be a „cross-sectional law“. The 
position as a “cross-sectional law” derives from the entirety of laws which are 
summarized within the term of capital markets law. Those laws naturally cover all 
activities on any capital markets in general and include in particular e. g. the law on 
securities; banking law; stock exchange rules; and investment laws. Therefore there 
are also many sources of law at a European level lik  the “insider dealing” Direc-
tive78 and the “investment services” Directive79. 
 
It will be apparent from the discussion above that e European Enterprise Law can 
be characterised as a densely regulated area of Eurpean law. Although at the very 
beginning the European Enterprise Law was nothing more than a small string 
linking different fields of law, it developed over time to a tightly knit network of 
laws. The legal harmonization of this field of law however did not keep pace with 
this development unlike the harmonization in other branches of law like e.g. con-
sumer protection. But it remains noteworthy that the process of legal harmonization 
did indeed gather considerable momentum in recent yars. 
 
                                                      
75 In detail Wolfram Birkenfeld, Der Einfluss des Gemeinschaftsrecht auf die Rechtsverwirklichung im 
Steuerrecht – Eine Bestandsaufnahme, 75 STEUER UND WIRTSCHAFT (ZEITSCHRIFT) 55, 57 f. (1998) 
with further bibliography. 
76 Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July, 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable to 
mergers, divisions, transfer of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Member 
States, Official Journal L 225, 20/08/1990, 1 ff. For an overview compare Brigitte Knobbe-Keuk, Die 
beiden Unternehmenssteuerrichtlinien, 3 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 336, 341 
ff. (1992). 
77 Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July, 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the 
case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, Official Journal L 225, 
20/08/1990, 6 ff. Compare for an introduction Knobbe-Keuk, supra note 76, at 337 ff. 
78 Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November, 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing, 
Official Journal L 334, 18/11/1989, 30 ff. 
79 Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May, 1993 on investment services in the securities field, Official 
Journal L 141, 11/06/1993, 27 ff. 
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III FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT  
The general importance of the freedom of establishment as a European fundamental 
freedom has already been pointed out before.80 The freedom of establishment plays 
an especially important role concerning the transfer o  a company’s seat and cross-
border mergers of companies. But beyond all controversial questions which may 
arise at first glance there even exists a deeply rooted dispute about a conflict of law. 
The matter in dispute is the determination of the company agreement and the sub-
sequent question whether this is determined according to the incorporation doctrine 
or according to the real seat doctrine. One of the eminent questions is whether a 
company with an ongoing operational business in one Member State can legally 
claim to have its real seat in another Member State. Another controversial aspect 
concerns the question, whether it is possible to enf rce certain foreign regulations 
in the Member State in which the company currently holds its seat to ensure certain 
legal requirements which do only exist in the foreign Member State where the 
company was once incorporated. When it comes to comparing the two relevant 
doctrines, aspects of clearer rules and steadiness mply a preference for the incorpo-
ration doctrine. In contrast, the real seat doctrine clearly favours national conserva-
tion interests of the Member States regarding issues lik  e. g. the involvement of 
employees; capital formation and maintenance; and directors’ liability. Daily Mail81 
was once interpreted to be a sign for the preferenc of the real seat doctrine. It was a 
questionable sign though as the case did not concern th  taking up residence but the 
actual departure. Consequently Centros82 can be seen as the turning point in favour 
of the incorporation doctrine, which was further strengthened by the now famous 
Überseering83 and Inspire Art84 cases. 
 
The recognition of the incorporation doctrine in cases of taking-up residence there-
fore eliminates a restriction on the taking-up resid nce of companies which were 
incorporated within the EU. This will lead to a competition among the legal systems 
of the European Member States especially with regards to the individual company 
laws. A good example of the fierce competition are th  preliminary and formation 
expenses of the British Limited which amount to just 1 £ (about 1.5 €) whilst even 
requiring only the most minor protection of creditors and shareholders at all. Yet 
another example is the advantages which the French legal form of a so called 
“blitz”-Société à responsabilité limitée (SARL; limited private partnership) bears in 
itself, which is on the one hand the incredibly fast incorporation and on the other 
                                                      
80 Compare Part B. I. 
81 ECJ, Judgment of 27 September, 1988 – Case 81/87, Rec. 1988, 5483. 
82 ECJ, Judgment of 9 March, 1999 – Case C-212/97, Rec. 1999, I-1459. 
83 ECJ, Judgment of 5 November, 2002 – Case C-208/00, Rec. 2002, I-9919. 
84 ECJ, Judgment of 30 September, 2003 – Case C-167/0, 14 EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 687, 687 ff. (2003) = 56 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 3331, 3331 f. 
(2003). Compare also Otto Sandrock, BB-Forum - Nach Inspire Art - Was bleibt vom deutschen Sitzrecht 
übrig?, 58 BETRIEBSBERATER (ZEITSCHRIFT) 2588, 2588 ff. (2003), and especially concerning the
“overlay doctrine“ Otto Sandrock, Die Schrumpfung der Überlagerungstheorie, 102 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 447, 447 (2003) as well as Walter Bayer, Die EuGH-
Entscheidung Inspire Art und die deutsche GmbH im Wettbewerb der europäischen Rechtsordnungen, 
58 BETRIEBSBERATER (ZEITSCHRIFT) 2357, 2357 ff. (2003). 
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hand the determination of the minimum capital by the partners themselves. For all 
of those reasons the appearance of pseudo-offshore-companies is to be expected. In 
the future the differences in approach among the various European Member States 
regarding the requirements for incorporation and protection mechanisms to ensure 
that the limited liability company is not abused will become more and more impor-
tant. The German system provides for two specific mechanisms to ensure that the 
privilege of incorporation and limited liability are not abused. First, the German has 
stricter requirements to control incorporation. Secondly, the German system also 
has strict principles for capital formation and maintenance. The so-called “British 
system” on the other hand is based on a Directors & Officers (D&O) liability; 
extensive disclosure requirements; and a strict insolvency law.  
 
However, there are serious issues regarding compatibility involved in the two 
systems, not even to mention the other alternative company law arrangements in the 
EU. It may lead to serious difficulties if all the l ss restrictive arrangement of all 
EU States will apply. For example, in view of the real seats theory, can a company 
incorporate under the British system with its lesser requirements for incorporation 
and capital maintenance, but insist that the less stringent German arrangements 
regarding the liability of directors and officers apply? This could easily lead to a 
type of a "race to the bottom" in the EU context — the concept that all corporations 
would like to incorporate in the European Members state where there are the least 
stringent requirements for incorporation and also the least stringent requirements 
for the liability of directors and officers.  
 
In contrast to the aspects of taking up residence, the legitimacy of restrictions on the 
departure of companies remains absolutely unclear in light of the Daily Mail deci-
sion. This issue concerns regulations which a Member State imposes upon compa-
nies which incorporated themselves within this Membr State and which revoke the 
legal capacity of a company once it transfers its real seat to another Member State. 
Due to reasons like the protection of creditors; minority shareholders; controlled 
companies; fiscal authorities; and their right to impose taxes, the general possibility 
of the use of domestic law and the limitations on its exceptional use have to be 
considered as well.  
 
Finally, yet another issue remains about the legitimacy of restrictions on the free-
dom of establishment to protect the participation rights of employees. Accordingly 
several essential aspects of the European Company Law have yet to be solved and a 
further on vivid discussion about the legal issues at take is necessary. Therefore 
one can speak of an urgent call for action on a further legal harmonization. 
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IV FORMS OF EUROPEAN COMPANIES 
The existing forms of European Companies were already mentioned before.85 They 
are the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) and the Societas Europaea 
(SE). The EEIG86 cannot be called a fully adequate form of a company though as it 
does not intend to realize its profits but is only allowed to act as a cooperative union 
of its members to serve their economic interests by auxiliary activities. Currently 
there are about 1,400 registered EEIGs within the EU of which 362 operate in 
Belgium, 243 in France, 163 in Great Britain and finally 143 in Germany. 
 
The SE on the other hand seems to be quite a bit of a political compromise. The 
most obvious fact supporting this conclusion is the existence of two regulations on 
the topic of the SE, a Council Regulation87 and another Council Directive88 with 
special regard to the involvement of employees. Theearliest proposals for the SE 
can be traced back to the years 1970, 1975, 1989 and 1991. The political compro-
mise though was not made until the EU talks at Nice in December 2000. There are 
two important aspects within the establishment regulations of the SE which prove 
its cross-border existence. First there is a possibility of a cross-border transfer of the 
company’s seat (via a transfer proposal) without the need to dissolve the company 
or to establish a new company. But there is also the choice between a unitary and a 
two-tier board structure. The involvement of employees has been established in a 
more complex way though. First of all the different bodies and the employees have 
to agree on a model of participation. But if an agreement cannot be reached, a set of 
standard principles will stand in for an agreement and will be as strict as the strict-
est model of participation which exists among any of the companies involved in the 
incorporation.  
 
Although the SE came into existence in October 2004 as a legal body with a mini-
mum share capital of 120,000 €, it remains to be seen how popular the SE will be 
and how it will develop further. One thing is certain, because of the possibility that 
different types of SE could be incorporated as provided for in the EU provisions 
that enable the establishment of SEs, many different forms of SEs are likely to 
occur even within a single Member States. Therefore the aim of simplification of 
Company Law within the EU can only to a certain extent be reached with the Stat-
ute of the European Public Company. In the long run those Member State models 
are likely to succeed which pay the greatest attention to entrepreneurial aspects. 
Thus it will probably lead to a competition of the different models and not to a 
harmonization of law at all. This legal form of a company may even be a great 
disadvantage for German companies and may isolate them from the rest of Europe.  
                                                      
85 Compare Part B. II. 
86 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 of 25 July, 1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping 
(EEIG) Official Journal L 199, 31/07/1985, 1 ff. 
87 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October, 2001 on the Statute for a European Company 
(SE), Official Journal L 294, 10/11/2001, p. 1 ff. 
88 Council Directive 2001/86/EEC of 8 October, 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European Com-
pany with regard to the involvement of employees, Official Journal L 294, 10/11/2001, 22 ff. 
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As this legal form is especially supposed to be applied to cross-border mergers, 
companies will try to avoid the typically extensive German form of employees’ 
participation at all costs and will avoid merging with German companies as they 
would have to adopt the German models of employee participation. After the incor-
poration doctrine has been established,89 the legal form of the SE becomes espe-
cially questionable with regard to the possibility of a transfer of the company’s seat 




V TAKEOVER LAW 
Let us now deal with the most central aspect of mergers and acquisitions, Takeover 
Law. Takeover Law goes back in history for more than 30 years now. First of all, 
Takeover Law aims at creating a Level playing Field and thus aims at a rearrange-
ment of the European economy and at an improvement of the international competi-
tiveness of European Companies. It therefore uses th  several means of a 
harmonization of Takeover Law to achieve a Level Playing Field, including en-
couragement of company restructuring; stability of the law during takeovers; pro-
tection of minority shareholders; and counter-measures against takeovers. Efforts to 
create a single European Takeover Law90 had already been undertaken for decades 
when the European Parliament decided on July 4th, 2001 to temporarily dismiss the 
whole issue. A year afterwards though, the European Parliament initiated a proposal 
for a Directive on takeover bids91 on October 2nd, 2002 and put the proposal for-
ward as part of the co-decision procedure.92 The Directive, put into force in April 
2004, still constitutes nothing more than a compromise and therefore can only be 
regarded as a minimum solution.93 This is especially true as the existing structures 
                                                      
89 See Part C. 
90 Regarding the development of European Takeover Lawsee for an overview Alexander Zinser, 
Entwicklungen zu einem europäischen Übernahmerecht, 36 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 78, 78 ff. 
(2003), 
91 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on takeover bids, Official 
Journal C 45 E, 25/02/2003, 1 ff.; printed as well in 57 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 1863, 
1863 ff. (2002). See also the report from BARBARA DAUNER-LIEB &  MARCO LAMANDINI (REPORT TO 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON THE COMMISSION’S NEW PROPOSAL OF A DIRECTIVE ON COMPANY LAW 
CONCERNING TAKEOVER BIDS, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HIGH 
LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS SET UP BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND TO THE 
ACHIEVEMENT OF A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD IN THE DOMAIN OF TAKEOVER BIDS, Study no. IV/2002/06/01) 
and regarding that compare also Barbara Dauner-Lieb & Marco Lamandini, Der neue 
Kommissionsvorschlag einer EU-Übernahmerichtlinie - Stellungnahme der Gutachter des EU-
Parlaments, 58 BETRIEBSBERATER (ZEITSCHRIFT) 265, 265 ff. (2003). 
92 This proposal is based on the results from the Winter group, a High Level Group of Company Law 
Experts, see <http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/news/02-24.htm>. 
93 Directive 2004/25/EEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April, 2004 on takeover 
bids, Official Journal L 142, 30/04/2004, 12 ff. 
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within Company Law remain intact and the only adjustment factors are market 
forces and the competition of the different legal systems.94 
 
The European Takeover Code is generally based on the principle of neutrality 
among the members of the board of the offeree company in case of a hostile bid. 
Therefore the Takeover Code abandons defensive measures like multiple voting 
rights and limitations on voting rights but exceptionally grants Member States the 
option to hold on to some defensive measures. However, the Takeover Code grants 
general meetings the authority to either dismiss this option and accept the Takeover 
Code or to accept the option yet again after it has been dismissed once by a share-
holders’ resolution. Having said that, some serious problems may arise in Germany 
as Germany already abolished the multiple voting rights in an attempt to anticipate 
future developments (an example of 'hurried obedience') and by doing this the 
principle of neutrality was more or less destroyed. Ultimately, the framework of the 
Takeover Code becomes less clear and the use of defensive measures is left to the 
individual company’s discretion. In conclusion it has to be put on record that the 
compromise on the European Takeover Law is as a matter of fact anything but a 
compromise and can only be regarded as a collective of the interests of the individ-
ual Member States which does not set a good example on the harmonization of law 
at all. 
 
VI  ACTION PLAN ON “M ODERNISING COMPANY LAW AND 
ENHANCING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE EU”  
PRESENTED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON                
MAY 21ST, 2003 
In the European Union, the set of rules for Corporate Governance is not only 
formed by acts governing a company’s formation, operation and termination. More 
and more, Codes of Corporate Governance become morepr minent, especially 
since almost fifty codes of Corporate Governance exist in Europe. Many of these 
codes are based on a “comply or explain”-approach, i.e. listed companies are in-
vited to disclose whether they comply with the code and to explain any deviations. 
The addressees of the codes are often required to specify annually the principles 
with which they have complied and explain the extent of and the reasons for any 
material non-compliance. 
 
The added value of the Corporate Governance Codes is that they bring an end to the 
uncontrolled growth of numerous private recommendations. Thus, the Codes con-
                                                      
94 Regarding the correlation with the Art. 1 of the German Gesetz zur Regelung von öffentlichen 
Angeboten zum Erwerb von Wertpapieren und von Unternehmensübernahmen (WpÜG) of 20 
December, 2001, BGBl. I, S. 3822, compare for instance Ingo Saenger, Tendenzen im europäischen 
Übernahmerecht: Die Vereinbarkeit des deutschen WpÜG mit dem Richtlinienvorschlag vom 
2. 10. 2002, in RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG ALS ZUKUNFTSTRÄCHTIGE AUFGABE - MÜNSTER STUDIES IN 
COMPARATIVE LAW (Otto Sandrock et. al. eds., Volume 100, 2004). 
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tribute to legal certainty. Besides, a Corporate Governance Code provides transpar-
ency of domestic corporate laws which is especially mportant for foreign investors.  
 
But, on the one hand, the high number of codes which may lead to confusion and 
which possesses potential conflicts, might be a reason for a European “Super-
Code”. On the other hand, it can be doubted if an additional code will solve these 
problems. In general, it can be questioned how far the structures of European Cor-
porate Law can be harmonized at all, since a unitary co porate model does not exist 
and each domestic regulation has its own identity. Among other reasons, the inten-
tion of the European Commission is not, as it has repeatedly been stressed, to pro-
duce a European Corporate Governance Code. Instead of implementing an 
additional Code, the Commission confines itself to give Recommendations. Unlike 
other initiatives taken at EU level in the area of c mpany law which are based on 
Article 44 (2) g of the EC Treaty, the legal basis for the recommendation is Article 
211 of the EC Treaty, which gives the Commission power to formulate recommen-
dations on matters dealt with in the EC Treaty. Moreover, also in contrast with 
domestic Corporate Governance Codes, the Recommendation is not designated for 
direct use by listed companies, but it addresses member states which should be free 
when implementing the Recommendation to decide to introduce in their national 
framework binding provisions where appropriate. Nevertheless, due to the practical 
effect of the Recommendation to curtail companies’ flexibility to adopt its own 
board structure, the current Recommendation on the role of independent non-
executive or supervisory directors was criticized an  finally several compromises 
were reached on the strict requirements for independence. It should be appreciated 
that it will almost be impossible for German public companies to comply with a 
strict requirement of having a majority of independt non-executive directors 
because there are employee representatives sitting on the supervisory boards of 
many listed corporations and because there are often representatives from the banks 
serving on the supervisory boards of many large German corporations.95 Hence, on 
the background of numerous domestic Corporate Governance codes and bearing the 
European pluralism of interests in mind, it will beinteresting to watch the future 
acceptance and effect of the Recommendation.  
 
In recent years though, European Company and Business Law has advanced quite a 
few steps. The proposals made within the Action Plan on “Modernising Company 
Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the EU” presented by the European 
Commission on May 21st, 2003 actually derive from the report of the High Level 
Group of Company Law Experts (so-called “Winter group”) on a Modern Regula-
tory Framework for Company Law in Europe which was published in November 
2002.96 The European Commission published the Action Plan on the same day as 
                                                      
95 Klaus J Hopt, Modern Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European Corporate 
Governance After Enron, 3 JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW STUDIES 221, 237-238 (2003). See also Jean J 
du Plessis, The German Two-Tier Board and the German Corporate Governance Code, 15 EUROPEAN 
B.L REV. 1139, 1151 (2004). 
96 Compare Silja Maul, Erich Eggenhofer & Georg Lanfermann, Aktionsplan der Europäischen 
Kommission zur Reform des Europäischen Gesellschaftsrechts, 58 BETRIEBSBERATER (ZEITSCHRIFT) 
1289, 1289 ff. (2003). Regarding the report of the Winter group see Peter Wiesner, Neue Brüsseler 
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the proposal for ten priorities on the audit of company accounts. The Action Plan is 
prioritised over the short term (2003 – 2005), medium-term (2006 – 2008) and 
long-term (2009 onwards), and indicates which type of regulatory instrument 
should be used for each proposal, with approximate tim scales. The regulatory 
instruments include non- binding recommendations as well as specific directives. 
The main objectives of the Action Plan are to harmonize corporate governance 
rules; to strengthen shareholders’ rights and protecti n for employees; and to foster 
the efficiency and competitiveness of business with special attention to some spe-
cific cross-border issues. Former Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein 
said with regard to the Action Plan that “economies only work if companies are run 
efficiently and transparently” which is the very reason why the EC has “to be a 
model for the rest of the world”.97 
 
Short-term recommendations (2003 – 2005) are to improve the EU framework for 
corporate governance, specifically through:  
- enhanced corporate governance disclosure requirements;  
- an integrated legal framework to facilitate efficient shareholder information, 
communication and decision-making, on a cross-border basis, using where 
possible modern technology;  
- modernisation of company boards, specifically through  
o strengthening the role of independent non-executive and supervisory         
         directors; 
o an appropriate regime for directors’ remuneration; 
o confirming as a matter of EU law the collective responsibility of board 
members for the company’s financial and key non-financial statements; 
- setting up a structure to co-ordinate the corporate governance efforts of   
Member States.  
 
The annual corporate governance statement should at least include the following 
key items:  
o the operation of the shareholders meeting and its key powers;  
o the rights attached to shares and how these rights can be executed;  
o the operation of the board and its committees and the procedure for 
the appointment of board members;  
o the shareholders holding major shareholdings and their voting and 
control rights; 
o the other direct and indirect relationships with the major sharehold-
ers;  
o transactions with other parties;  
o existence and nature of a risk management system and 
o a reference to a national code of corporate governance. 
 
                                                                                                                               
Impulse für Corporate Governance und Gesellschaftsrecht, 58 BETRIEBSBERATER (ZEITSCHRIFT) 213, 
213 ff. (2003). 
97 Citation according to Rolf Wägenbaur, EU-Kommission plant Modernisierung des  
Unternehmensrechts, 36 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK 343, 343 f. (2003). 
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Capital maintenance and formation shall be simplified on the basis of the SLIM 
recommendations as supplemented in the “Winter report”. The “SLIM-plus” – 
Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market – proposals aim at a modernisation of 
the acquisition of own shares, management buy out, the prohibition of issuing 
shares without pre-emption rights and of the elimination of experts’ valuations for 
contributions in kind. Initiatives aiming at improving the financial and non-
financial information disclosed by company groups and pyramids in the form of an 
amendment to a Directive are short-term priorities as well. Further, the Commission 
intends to present a new proposal for a Tenth Company L w Directive facilitating 
mergers between companies from different Member States, s well as a proposal for 
a Fourteenth Company Law Directive on the transfer o  seat. The Commission also 
proposes to launch a feasibility study on the possible introduction of a European 
Private Company Statute, which would primarily serve the needs of SMEs active in 
more than one Member State. Finally, the Commission wa ts to support the ongo-
ing process aimed at the introduction of several European legal forms like the 
European Association and the European Mutual Society. 
 
Other corporate governance initiatives for the medium term (2006 – 2008) proposed 
in the Action Plan include achieving better information on the role played by insti-
tutional investors in corporate governance; giving further effect to the principle of 
proportionality between capital and control; offering to listed companies the choice 
between the unitary and two-tier board structure, and enhancing directors’ respon-
sibilities for financial and key non-financial statements. The Commission intends to 
undertake a study on a real shareholder democracy (one share – one vote) and let 
the study clarify the consequences of such an approch. With regards to capital 
maintenance and alteration, the Commission will launch a study into the feasibility 
of an alternative regime not based on the concept of capital maintenance. The 
Action Plan advocates a framework rule concerning company groups and pyramids 
to allow those managing a company belonging to a group to implement a coordi-
nated group policy. Moreover, the need for action against abusive pyramids (i.e. 
chains of holding companies whose sole or main assets ar  their shareholding in 
another listed company) is underlined. The Commission also proposes to simplify 
some of the requirements under the Third Company Law Directive (national merg-
ers) and the Sixth Directive (national divisions) con erning corporate restructuring 
of public limited companies. If the feasibility study on the Statute for a European 
Private Company confirms the need for such an initiative, the Commission will 
present a proposal for an EPC statute in the medium ter  as well. Further, with 
respect to the possible development of a proposal fr a Regulation on a European 
Foundation, the Commission intends to launch a study aiming at assessing in depth 
the feasibility of such a statute. Finally, the Commission considers increased disclo-
sure requirements for all legal entities with limited liability to be necessary in the 
medium term. 
 
Regarding long-term priorities (2009 onwards) the Action Plan will offer an alter-
native to the capital maintenance regime as an amend t to the rules of the Sec-
ond Directive, if the feasibility study indeed confirms the effectiveness and benefits 
of an alternative regime. Altogether, the Action Plan wants to provide a dynamic 
and flexible company law framework to overcome the pr dominant stagnation of 
2005 European Company and Business Law   317     
 
European Business Law. Nevertheless, the Action Pla will not have as many 
outreach effects as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act had in the United States. 
 
Finally a brief note from the German point of view: With special regards to corpo-
rate governance, the German public is nowadays greatly concerned with the disclo-
sure of the board of directors’ income. Only eleven out of 30 companies within the 
German Stock Index DAX disclosed the overall spending on the income of each 
director in 2003. The other 19 companies decided to only disclose the overall 
spending on the income of the board of the directors as a whole. But the companies 
arose special annoyance when the public became aware of an alliance-like “agree-
ment to stay silent” about the individual income of each director. This special 
agreement was especially brought to public attention by the head of the government 
commission on corporate governance, Theodor Baums. 
 
The German Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Act) though, requires companies to 
give a public statement whether they are enforcing the so-called German Corporate 
Governance Code. And this German Code includes the need to disclose the individ-
ual income of each director. Therefore this special need for disclosure is one of the 
code’s regulations which is rarely enforced among German companies after all. 
Special emphasis to this conflict was recently added by the criminal law investiga-
tions and the criminal law trial regarding the Mannesmann/Vodafone acquisition. 
The judgment of the district court at Düsseldorf held that bonus payments paid after 
closing of the transaction in favour of former members of the company board do not 
represent a criminal offence, but still represent an offence regarding the German 
Stock Corporation Act. 
  
Therefore, German companies are confronted with demands for a full and strict 
disclosure of any payments to the individual board members and directors, with 
special regard to pensions and bonus payments. It i currently even considered to 
propose an amendment to the German Stock Corporation Act that would require 
companies to present different payment models for the directors at the shareholder 
meetings and the payment models would then be decided upon by a shareholder 
resolution. Recently, the German Minister of Justice even threatened companies to 
propose such an amendment to the German Stock Corporation Act in case the 
companies do not comply with existing disclosure requirements until their next 
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VII SUMMARY 
This Tour d’Horizon through the European Company and Business Law was aimed 
at underlining the legal and economic importance of this field of law. At the same 
time the very dynamic process of the European harmonization of law is just as 
interesting to acknowledge. The integration of Company Law, Business Law and 
Capital Markets Law into the European Law has recently gained strong momentum. 
Therefore the new EC Member States do have a great possibility to participate in 
the making of legal frameworks for the whole European Community and in the 
proper harmonization of their legal system. But at he same time the potential for 
fierce future competition among the legal systems should be kept in mind. 
 
 
